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ABSTRACT 
In the decades before, and with greater intensity since 1945, the United States of 
America engaged in numerous “nation-building” efforts around the world, the focus of 
which was the creation, or the strengthening, of national military establishments in allied-
states. With the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization 
Act in 1986, Foreign Internal Defense (FID) became a legislatively directed activity of 
the Special Operations Forces of the U.S. Army. Since 1986, FID has been formally 
defined by the U.S. Department of the Army as the “participation by civilian and military 
agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or 
other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, 
and insurgency” (DA FM 3-05.202, 2007, p. 1). This thesis provides an examination of 
the effectiveness of the U.S. Army’s FID. It argues that FID, or what can also be 
characterized as foreign army building, has failed more often than it has succeeded. 
Furthermore, this failure is primarily a result of a clash of military traditions between the 
U.S advisors conducting FID and the recipient military establishments. Under these 
circumstances, the FID model needs to be altered. Applying a revised, more flexible 
version of FID, would yield greater success in current and future FID operations. 
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Outside of United States military circles, very few people have heard of Foreign 
Internal Defense (FID) or know what it entails. Since the rise of the United States of 
America as a global power following World War II, Washington has presided over a 
large, overlapping set of military-defense security alliances with nation-states around the 
world. Even before its formal codification in 1986, FID-like operations (or, what more 
precisely might be described as foreign army building) were a key element in these 
arrangements. At the same time, numerous governments from Latin America to Africa, 
and from the Middle East to Asia, have actively sought military defense, security-
oriented aid from, and formal alliances with, Washington during and after the Cold War. 
Meanwhile, the U.S. has attempted to ally itself with the governments concerned, through 
a variety of types of aid and assistance. Despite its relative obscurity, FID has been 
central to a large number of these U.S. efforts to build partnerships and support friendly 
regimes. The U.S. Department of the Army formally defines FID as “participation by 
civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by 
another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from 
subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency” (DA FM 3-05.202, 2007, p. 1–1). 
Both before and after the explicit enunciation of FID, following the passage of the 
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act in 1986, the U.S. military 
sought, and continues to seek, to bolster foreign military establishments (that is engage in 
foreign army building) by training and equipping them in order to help the host nation 
improve its internal defense capabilities. Since 1986, FID has become a legislatively 
directed activity of SOF. The United States has conducted, and continues to conduct, 
hundreds of FID programs around the world. Given the now widespread application of 
FID, in the wider context of the waxing and waning of concerns about nation-building (or 
state-building), to which FID is a central part. A thorough examination of the 
effectiveness of FID is not only justified, but overdue. To this end, this introductory 
chapter discusses the background and history of FID. It then turns to an examination of 
the still very limited research that focuses explicitly on FID, while also discussing related 
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works on the theory and practice of nation-building and state-building. This is followed 
by a more detailed evaluation of some of the key theories of modernization, development, 
and state-building as they relate to FID. This introductory chapter ends with a brief 
delineation of the overall content and main themes of the chapters that follow, while also 
spelling out the overall argument of the thesis. The fundamental concern is to make clear 
the current shortcomings that characterize FID and focus on how to overcome those 
shortcomings. 
A. A SHORT HISTORY OF FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE AND THE 
DELINEATION OF FID DOCTRINE 
Where FID is being conducted, the U.S. government works with its host nation 
counterparts, through the embassy teams, in the country concerned. The embassy teams 
operate an Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) program, and FID is an important 
part of this strategy. The U.S. National Security Council and State Department are the 
primary agencies involved in FID program development. The goal of FID is to create a 
fully functioning military force that is responsive to the particular allied government, and 
enable it to maintain internal security and stability (DA FM 3-05.202, 2007). As noted at 
the outset, FID was officially codified in 1986 with the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols 
Department of Defense Reorganization Act. At that time, the United States Military 
Special Operations Forces (SOF) was given the primary responsibility for planning and 
conducting FID in support of the United States of America’s foreign policy objectives. 
Despite formal responsibility for FID being given to SOF, Foreign Internal Defense has 
now become a key “competency” within a broad array of overseas operations and 
programs for which the U.S. military in general is responsible. In order to facilitate the 
practice of FID, and establish a FID Doctrine, the U.S. Department of Defense has 
published some (albeit still limited) literature on the subject. For example, Joint 
Publication 3–07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and procedures for Foreign Internal 
Defense, outlines what it understands to be the military responsibilities and objectives in 
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the performance of FID. It states that the goal of FID is to organize, train, and equip 
foreign militaries to be able to support the security and stability of their governments 
(DoD JP 3–07.1, 2004, p. 69). 
In order to achieve this goal the DoD document states that the U.S. military 
personnel concerned should “tailor military support of FID programs to the environment 
and the specific needs of the supported Host Nation” (DoD JP 3–07.1, 2004, p. xi). 
However, it is increasingly clear that over the course of the actual conduct of FID in a 
wide range of countries, U.S. military advisers consistently ignore the "tailoring" element 
of current FID doctrine. What the U.S. military personnel do repeatedly when assigned to 
carry out FID is attempt to reorganize host nation militaries so that they mirror the 
organizational structure of the U.S. military.  In the vast majority of cases where FID has 
been conducted—including the decades prior to 1986—the implicit model is the U.S. 
military itself (generally a somewhat romanticized version of the U.S. military model), 
and the goal of virtually every FID operation is to turn the military establishment in 
question into a copy of the U.S. military.   
Exacerbating the problem further, is the fact that after host nation militaries are 
organized according to the U.S. template, the host nation forces are then trained using the 
same approach that is believed to be effective for U.S. forces: the "crawl-walk-run" 
method. The U.S. Army refers to this as “the most effective method of training to 
standard," and it involves "teaching individual student tasks, battle drills, collective tasks, 
and STXs [Situational Training Exercises]" based on the assumption that this is the only 
way to develop "well-trained leaders and units” (DA FM 31–20-3,1994, p. 3–3). In fact, 
the U.S. military personnel conducting FID invariably use the U.S. Army Field Manual 
(FM) 7-8, Infantry Rifle, Platoon and Squad, to accomplish these goals and teach ground 
combat tactics to foreign forces. Furthermore, despite the often dubious results, there is a 
continued unwillingness to address the fact that FM 7–8 was designed to teach U.S. 
forces and was not designed to instruct forces that have emerged out of what are vastly 
different organizational backgrounds, social contexts or military traditions. 
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There is a common chain of events that characterizes FID missions in the 
countries where they have taken place or are taking place. U.S. forces arrive, reorganize, 
and train host nation units along similar lines to the U.S. military. This action is done 
with no consideration for the pre-existing organizational structure of the host nation 
forces, its military traditions, or the wider social and political context. FID advisers use 
the U.S. model as the default setting, and train accordingly. In the beginning, while under 
direct supervision of American personnel, the host nation forces attempt to emulate, or at 
least engage in the pretence of emulating, the U.S. model. However, as soon as U.S. 
advisers leave the country, host nation forces revert to the same organizational structure 
and training methods that they had been using before the U.S.-led FID mission arrived on 
the scene. As will be demonstrated in the case studies in subsequent chapters, despite 
concerted effort by FID advisors over the course of their in-country missions, the host 
nation forces consistently retain and revert to their pre-existing military traditions. Time 
has shown that despite a huge number of FID-style operations dating back at least to the 
early decades of the twentieth century, U.S. military organizational structures and 
practices have failed to take root in the vast majority of cases. This in turn indicates that 
there is a problem in the United States’ approach to conducting FID. 
B. NATION-BUILDING AND THEORIES OF FID 
Research on, and studies of, FID specifically are very limited, confined primarily 
to military manuals produced by the U.S. Department of Defense. However, FID (and 
foreign army building) is arguably a key component in the theory and practice of nation-
building, or state-building. A military’s ability to maintain security and stability are 
crucial in the conducting of nation-building; it is the foundation for all other means of 
assistance to a foreign government engaged in the process of nation-building.  
The research on FID produced by the U.S. military lacks a holistic understanding 
of the problem sets that are involved in the execution of FID. Current research on FID by 
the DOD has focused mainly on the individual as the unit of analysis. There is a 
preponderance of studies being produced by the U.S. military that attempt to solve the 
problems associated with the failure of FID operations to effectively create, or strengthen, 
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foreign military establishments by focusing on cultural awareness and language skills at 
the individual level. The U.S. military’s main effort to make FID more effective, focuses 
on the individual U.S. soldier-advisor. It seeks to empower him by providing a better 
cultural understanding of his counterpart. The wider goal is to conduct a bottom-up 
approach to creating, reorganizing, and ultimately standing up an allied-military 
establishment, which can provide a foundation and the framework for nation-building 
more generally.  
History has demonstrated that this approach has not produced much in the way of 
positive results. There is a need to move beyond current military thought on FID, and 
utilize other approaches that will benefit the theory and practice of FID specifically, and 
nation-building (or state-building) more generally. Various disciplines, such as sociology, 
anthropology, political science, international relations, history, and even business studies, 
can be brought to highlight the importance of carrying out FID in a fashion that focuses 
on establishing genuine congruence at the collective, organizational, and institutional 
levels between the U.S. advisors on one hand, and their host nation counterparts on the 
other hand.  
It is often said that the military is a microcosm of the society of which it is a part 
(setting aside the question of whether or not some military establishments are in fact 
‘connected’ to the society concerned—clearly some are not and therein lies a particularly 
profound problem worth noting, but beyond the scope of this thesis). If we follow this 
logic, then the best, and possibly the easiest way, forward is for the military to be 
organized in a way that acknowledges the societal norms and ‘national’ context from 
which it has, or will, emerge and within which it operates. If a particular society is 
defined or self-identified by a strong emphasis on education, or a rigid caste system and a 
high level of social stratification, then the question becomes whether the military 
organization should emulate these differences, or at least address them in some fashion. 
Attempting to stand up a military organization contrary to a society’s traditions and 
military traditions, has proven time and time again to be a recipe for failure. The U.S. is 
viewed by many of its citizens as being an egalitarian society. There is a tendency to 
project a romanticized view of the United States of America, onto ‘America’ but also 
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onto humanity as a whole. Many of the host nations FID-advisors work in do not share 
American ideas about equality and meritocracy generally, or the meritocratic structure 
and practice of the U.S. military more specifically. These structures and practices are 
themselves often romanticized consciously or unconsciously by members of the 
American military.  
Soldiers and academics have been pointing out these problems for over 40 years. 
Former WWII Polish Army Officer and later renowned sociologist Stanislav Andreski is 
one such individual. Stanislav Andreski (1968) argues in Military Organization and 
Society that many social strata are fixed, and prevent the movement of individuals 
upward in the power continuum (p. 21). These types of societies are very unlikely to 
adopt the U.S. military model. In many traditional societies, the military leaders are the 
key power brokers in politics. Andreski further states that it is not surprising that the 
military leaders form the supreme stratum of a society (p. 26). Economics are a key factor 
in stratifying a society; however, “(t)he pure plutocracy, that is to say, the rule of the rich 
who do not control” the military “can only be a temporary phenomenon” (Andreski, 
1968). This theorizing points directly to the military as a stratified element of a society. 
Working within these confines will help when organizing and equipping a foreign 
military.  
Additionally, political scientist and author, Emily O. Goldman focuses much of 
her research on the diffusion of military technology throughout different cultures. 
Military organizational structures can be seen as an example of technology and her 
research has some important implications for the concerns of this thesis. Goldman (2006) 
identifies the way elites, institutions and culture affect military innovation. The 
assimilation of modern ideas and practices is dependent on the society’s power brokers 
resistance to the modification of the stat quo (p. 69). In this context the military 
establishment, regardless of its size, is both a reflection of and a key element in the 
general social structure of any given host nation. When embarking on FID-operations it is 
important to take into account the relationship between the military traditions and the 
social structure of the host nation. An awareness of this crucial factor will help when 
engaging in foreign army building. 
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Meanwhile, political scientists, Dan Reiter and Allen Stam III (1998) claim that 
the benefits of democratic institutions empower the individual soldier and have better 
organizational efficacy, which reaps vast benefits on the battlefield (p. 259). Regime type 
lends some credence to the effectiveness of a military in a given situation. With this study 
focusing on the national level as the unit of analysis, it only makes sense that this 
research may be applicable. It is quite possible that many of the regimes we need to 
empower have seriously limited the power of their military to prevent a coup. Nepotism 
and political appointments run rampant in these types of situations. Leaders must protect 
themselves from the loss of power. “This encourages the civilian leadership to promote 
military leaders who are politically loyal to the regime rather than leaders who are 
militarily competent and to frequently rotate officers to prevent them from developing 
close ties with their troops" (Tullock, 1987, p. 116). In the U.S., we are accustomed to 
being told that a meritocracy-based system is the cornerstone of social life, an outlook 
that regularly blinds us to the realities on the ground both at home and overseas. 
Although the United States of America celebrates its meritocratic social system, it is clear 
to any informed observer that America has historically and continues to have a well-
defined albeit changing social hierarchy. Opportunity is abundant, but social stratification 
remains. In the case of FID, part of the problem is that the often-praised meritocratic 
system for which America is famous is more prevalent in theory and in practice in the 
U.S. military than it is in U.S. society as a whole.  
While Henry Mintzberg (the business expert) theorizes mainly about business 
structures and their effectiveness and synchronization with their environment, his work 
has major implications for the relationship between military organizations and the 
societies to which they are connected and important insights for the revised practice of 
FID. His major contribution to the literature is stated in his article Organizational design: 
fashion or fit? He argues that in order for an organization to be effective, it must fit with 
its environment (1981, p. 104). This theory is critical to understanding the way militaries 
are designed and function.  In subsequent chapters, this thesis will demonstrate the 
relevance of Mintzenberg’s research, by applying his model to military organizations and 
FID operations in various countries, to help answer the question: does the modern U.S. 
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military model align with the countries the U.S. military will work with, or is there a 
better structure that will fit in a given environment?  
Also of relevance here is the book After War by the reconstruction pundit 
Christopher J. Coyne, which discusses the problems associated with post war 
reconstruction. After War, is a recent and important contribution to the burgeoning 
literature on nation-building and post-war reconstruction. FID, as Coyne and others 
imply, is involved in a post war reconstruction and the foundation for successful nation-
building is a solid military and police force that can provide security and stability. Coyne 
is concerned that the U.S has had and will continue to have many problems in the various 
post conflict settings in which it finds itself. Military victories in future conflicts will be 
relatively easy for the United States of America as the world’s sole remaining 
superpower. The problems facing the global superpower will come in the post conflict, or 
nation-building phase of our interventions. FID practitioners who interface with foreign 
armies in post military operations will find Coyne’s book extremely helpful in 
negotiating the labyrinth of post-war reconstruction issues. 
Coyne’s argument is that “policymakers and occupiers face an array of 
constraints—both internal and external to the country being reconstructed—that make 
reconstruction efforts more likely to fail than to succeed” (Coyne, 2008, p. 173). Why 
then did the U.S. do so well at reconstruction in post WWII Japan and West Germany? 
Why can’t it be replicated again? Coyne deftly examines the two historical reconstruction 
success stories of West Germany and Japan. He shows why those cases were successful, 
and why the lessons learned there are not carried through or applied to present-day 
nation-building and foreign army building.  
According to Coyne, the key problem was solved in West Germany and Japan 
prior to reconstruction. The unconditional surrender of the government of these countries 
unified their people and solved a lot of meta-level issues. The governments and militaries 
concerned had capitulated and they proceeded to allow foreigners to play a crucial role in 
the reconstruction of their political and social systems and their military establishments. 
From this point onwards, reconstruction period focused on solving a range of underlying 
problems related to coordination and cooperation. Iraq and Afghanistan, and many of our 
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future conflicts will put the U.S. in a position of attempting to solve the meta-level game 
rather than dealing with the underlying problems associated with ‘national’ coordination 
and cooperation. In the latter two polities, there are currently no national norms and 
structures to help frame a unifying FID operation. Developing competent foreign armies 
in this context is very problematic and takes considerable time, effort and public will. 
Coyne’s book After War presents a cogent argument and offers a major contribution to 
the ongoing dialogue surrounding post conflict nation-building and reconstruction. 
Furthermore, his book shows that FID will play, or will need to play, a key role in any 
type of intervention and post-war reconstruction the U.S may attempt now and in the 
future.  
More broadly, this thesis argues that post-war reconstruction and foreign army 
building needs to concentrate on national level structures and culture, while making every 
effort to develop a better understanding of the particularities of the FID-oriented tasks we 
are undertaking. A combination of nation-building theory and military-oriented realism 
can result in the more effective conduct of FID. A broad-based top-down approach that 
analyzes the nation as a whole and addresses its specific characteristics will provide us 
with many of the answers to successful FID. While, individual cultural awareness and 
language skills are a great enabler, they are not enough. We must first look at the larger 
context before focusing on its individual components, and avoid using notions of 
‘culture’, both our own and those of the host nation in a rigid and deterministic fashion. 
At the same time, one should also avoid assuming that social structures and military and 
other traditions are easily altered. For example, there is a strong and deeply rooted belief 
among many Americans (articulated in theory if not in practice) that the principles of 
democracy will bring about peace and development. While there exists some validity in 
this thought process, democratization cannot even begin to take effect until a political and 
social foundation is laid. A central part of this foundation is a strong security apparatus 
that can provide the stability for a more open political system and social and development 
programs to take root.  Synthesizing the various theoretical insights discussed above 
could enable the U.S. military to develop the appropriate FID approach for a given host 
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nation—rather than applying the same approach across a range of countries with different 
“neo-traditional” political and social arrangements. 
C. FID IN ACTION AND THE NEO-TRADITIONAL CHALLENGE 
In relation to this point, it is important to note that the U.S. military is invariably 
deployed to conduct FID in countries that can be said fit the “neo-traditional” model. 
Generally, we have not and will not be conducting FID in “modern” countries. The 
interaction of the “modern meritocratic” and the “neo-traditional” models is the critical 
element in understanding and fashioning the appropriate approach to foreign army 
building. This thesis will provide an understanding of our “modern” model, the many 
variations on the neo-traditional model and the problems that can occur when the former 
encounters one or more of the latter.  
This thesis proposes that a combination of military FID structure, military goals, 
and a calibrated degree of cultural acceptance will generate FID success in a given 
country. These are three concepts that must all interact simultaneously to produce a 
successful FID outcome.  
 
 
Figure 1.   Three Concepts to Successful FID 
Successful FID will flow from the use of these three concepts and is comparable 
to a three-legged stool; if one leg is longer than the others, the stool will not function  
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properly and may even fall. It is the balance of all three "legs" that produces a military 
capable of providing security and stability to a foreign government. See Figure 2 for a 
graphical depiction of this concept. 
 
Figure 2.   Three-Legged Stool Approach to Successful FID 
The goals and culture of a foreign military are deeply embedded, and therefore 
cannot be readily changed by U.S. personnel. The one element that can be easily altered 
is the FID structural model the United States uses to increase military capabilities. A 
detailed pre-FID mission analysis of the existing structure, goals, and culture will enable 
FID practitioners to develop an appropriate FID structural model approach. If this 
argument is correct, and the model propounded here is applied, U.S. FID could be more 
effective in developing successful foreign militaries that are consistent with the existing 
structure, goals, and traditions of the host nation military. This approach should yield a 
result that is far more preferable to all stakeholders than the current approach. The 
structure, goals, and traditions of a foreign military are not readily controlled by U.S. 
personnel. The one element we can alter is the FID model we attempt to employ.  
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter reviewed the origins of FID and some parallel theories on nation-
building and post-war reconstruction, which provide insight into FID policy development 
and practice. This chapter has argued for a new approach to FID based on an evaluation 
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of our current FID methods and their repeated failure. Chapter II will look the models 
mentioned above in more detail. Chapter III and Chapter IV will provide detailed case 
studies of U.S. foreign army building: Vietnam in Chapter III and Colombia and El 
Salvador in Chapter IV. Overall, this thesis argues that the U.S. military’s execution of 
FID is critically flawed in the vast majority of cases. This assertion is supported by the 
fact that host nation forces consistently return to pre-FID organizational structures and 
traditions as soon as the U.S. military departs the host nation. Additionally, these forces 
are generally as ineffective after being subjected to a FID-operation as they were before. 
Many times the U.S FID forces try to make major structural or cultural changes to a 
traditional and non-egalitarian military. These changes are not welcomed and actually 
generate strife and a backlash. Thus, the question remains: Why does the United States 
insist on forcing the U.S. model on countries who will not readily adopt it? What would 
be a better method of conducting FID?  
To this end, this thesis will determine under what conditions the current United 
States Foreign Internal Defense model has been, or will be accepted and produce a 
military force capable of providing security and stability for the allied government 
concerned. In particular, the thesis seeks to determine whether there are certain 
preconditions in the host nation that, when analyzed and understood, can facilitate a 
better FID model being employed and result in a more successful outcome. Chapter V 
recommends and explicates a new approach to foreign army building. If this argument is 
correct, and the U.S. military were to embrace the new approach outlined here, we would 
see the U.S military being more successful at facilitating the building of foreign militaries 
in the future. 
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II. THE MERITOCRATIC-MILITARY MODEL VS. THE NEO-
TRADITIONAL MILITARY MODEL 
As was argued in the introductory chapter, when one observes the high number of 
countries in which FID operations have been, or are being carried out, the success record 
thus far is mixed at best. This raises the question as to why success rates are so low. At 
the outset, it needs to be remembered that FID has, and continues to, focus on specific 
nation-states. The unit of analysis for this critical evaluation of FID is the national level 
military force. It is worth noting too, that the focus of conventional nation-building or 
state-building operations down to the present remain focused on the ‘national’. The U.S. 
military, as this thesis argues, needs to re-examine the existing military organizational 
structure and context in any given national case (this might involve months of work by a 
dedicated ‘fact finding’ mission) prior to deploying a FID operation, In order to explore 
this question, this chapter contrasts two general models of military organization and the 
wider context from which these models have emerged. The goal here is to conduct a side-
by-side comparison of two idealized types of military organizational structures, and show 
that the application of the model favored by the United States is doomed to fail if the 
actual practitioners of FID do not pay careful attention to the particulars of the context in 
which they are conducting FID—even if their long-term goal is the creation of a military 
establishment similar to, or the same as, the U.S. model. It will become clear that the U.S. 
military model (which is the FID model) is at best a poor "fit" in the vast majority of 
situations where FID operations are conducted, which is why the U.S. model routinely 
fails to be adopted in the nation-state concerned.  
A. MODELS 
Two models of military organization will be used to examine and better 
understand FID and how to move beyond the current problems that afflict the vast 
majority of FID operations. It should be emphasized at the outset that both models are 
heuristic and schematic. They represent two ends of a spectrum and attempt to capture 
the fundamental differences across a range of organized standing armies and the need to 
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take this into account when conducting FID operations. The models used are the 
“meritocratic-military model” and the “neo-traditional military model.” Both models 
encompass considerable variation and both reflect the fact that from the moment a 
military organization comes into being it establishes and then reproduces its own 
particular military traditions, structures, doctrines and procedures. It is fair to say that 
prior to the First World War; all military establishments followed some form of the neo-
traditional model. It is only in the twentieth century that we start to see examples of the 
meritocratic-military model appearing, with the post-World War II U.S. military being 
the exemplar of this model (Arms, 1989).  
B. NEO-TRADITIONAL MILITARY MODEL 
The neo-traditional model, as the term is being used here, is characterized by a 
two-party hierarchy consisting of officers and enlisted soldiers. There is a tendency for a 
high degree of separation between the two groups based on social status. The span of 
control, defined as “the number of people directly reporting to the next higher level in the 
hierarchy” (Glindow, 2007, p. 236) is usually higher in the neo-traditional model than in 
the meritocratic model resulting in an organization with a flatter structure in the neo-
traditional case. This broader span of control may be a result of things such as limited 
differentiation between the duties of various soldiers (Refer to Table 1). The armies 
participating in the Napoleonic wars were a perfect example of the neo-traditional model. 
There was a drastic difference between the officers and enlisted men, a single officer 
controlled a large number of soldiers, and there was almost no specialization—when the 
command was given by the officer, the bulk of the participants charged straight ahead 
with rifles and bayonets as did their opponents, although there were variations in the 
overall form the charge took. Many developing nations operate under this model and 
have officer-centric military forces. The masses of the military enlisted are generally 
comprised of conscripts serving 18 to 24 months. The use of the traditional model being 
used in the countries of Iraq, Colombia, and Peru, as well as others, has been witnessed 
by the author. 
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C. MERITOCRATIC-MILITARY MODEL 
In contrast to the two-tiered neo-traditional model, the Meritocratic-Military-
Model is characterized by a four-tiered hierarchy involving officers, warrant officers, 
non-commissioned officers, and enlisted soldiers. This model exhibits a smaller span of 
control compared to the neo-traditional model. The Meritocratic-Military-Model is 
centered on a large, professional, tier of middle management and a high degree of 
specialization. One of the key features of the meritocratic-military-model is an extensive 
noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps. These are the Sergeants and the backbone of the 
military.  The NCO corps allows the span of control at any given level to be reduced to 
approximately three to five individuals. The effect of this reduced span of control is the 
increased vertical complexity of the entire military organization. The meritocratic-
military-model is often horizontally decentralized, with standardization of operations 
(Refer to Table 1). Standardization, coupled with competent and motivated forces, allows 
for decision making to be pushed down to a lower level, thereby reducing the time 
necessary to make decisions. We have worked hand-in-hand with many allied military 
establishments that are organized using the meritocratic-military-model very similarly to 
the United States, including Australia, Canada, Germany, United Kingdom, and others. 
D. THE ORIGINS OF THE MERITOCRATIC-MILITARY-MODEL 
The meritocratic military model can be seen to have emerged from the neo-
traditional military model, and its development was and is emblematic of wider historical 
changes generally, and changes in the technologies of warfare more specifically. The 
NCO corps was established in the early twentieth century in the modern armies of the 
world in order, to effectively project leadership to lower ranks and quickly adapt in 
situations of complex armed conflict. In the vernacular of organizational design, this is 
referred to as vertical complexity. In addition to adding another layer of management, the 
NCOs were given authority for making decisions on the battlefield. This is referred to as 
vertical decentralization. Decentralizing authority down to a level able to quickly see 
changes in the situation enabled front-line units to make decisions and increase the units 
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overall ability to rapidly react in a fluid environment. The increased number of 
empowered small-unit leaders enabled the combatant forces to deal better with the 
uncertainties of a complex battlefield. 
Although the meritocratic military model may be well-suited to modernized 
militaries and societies, the neo-traditional two-tiered structure may still work well for 
neo-traditional societies. As Henry Mintzberg observed in “Organizational Design: 
Fashion or Fit?” in order for an organization to be effective it must fit its environment 
(1981, p. 104). As such, it would be expected that a meritocratic-military-model would 
not be readily adopted in a neo-traditional setting. The existing neo-traditional structure is 
a complex system that is built around many factors (Figure 3). The neo-traditional model 
may have many merits when analyzed from this perspective. If the United States military 
is to conduct FID in a country that uses the neo-traditional model, it would be wise to 
understand the broader implications that accompany the neo-traditional model.  
1 
Figure 3.   Influences on Structure (Daft, 2001, p. 48) 
                                                 
1 Model retrieved from Professor Erik Jansen, MN3121 Organizational Design for Special Operations” 
2009 class on Open System Models.  
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E. CONTRASTS 
Certain organizational models fit better in a given society or environment. In an 
effort to determine features that affect the fit, the next sections contrast a range of aspects 
of the military, environment, and cultures that employ the different models. Several 
aspects of the two models presented may be salient to future theories. In some of the 
contrasts that will be discussed below, it is important to remember that the description is 
relative in relation to the two heuristic models being used. For example, if one compared 
an adhocracy to the meritocratic model they would see that the meritocratic model is very 
centralized. Centralization is defined as “the degree to which formal decision authority is 
held by a small group of people, typically those at the top of the organizational hierarchy” 
(McShane & Von Glinow, 2007). However, when compared to the neo-traditional model, 
the meritocratic model is quite decentralized.  
F. STRUCTURAL SECTION 
Table 1.   Structural Contrasts between Neo-traditional and Meritocratic Structures 
Category Neo-traditional Structure Meritocratic Structure 
Span of control 10 and higher 3 – 5 
Nominal structure 
  
Structure description Flat Tall 
Typical military rank 
distribution  
 
Higher enlisted to leader ratio 
 
Lower enlisted to leader ratio  
Hierarchy Less Complex  More Complex 
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Category Neo-traditional Structure Meritocratic Structure 
Formalization Low High 
Vertical decentralization 
Authority delegated to 
lower echelons 
Low 
Lower echelons have almost no 
authority 
High  
Lower echelons have more 
authority 
Horizontal decentralization 
Shift of power from line 
managers to staff managers, 








Number of different job 
specialties 
Low High 
Divisions Functional  Divisional 
G. STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 
Table 1 shows differences in the two models; the neo-traditional model differs 
from the meritocratic model in every category. The U.S. military structure is emblematic 
of the meritocratic model. The small span of control and higher leader to subordinate 
ratios allow for more decentralized operations. This structure allows the United States to 
leverage a meritocratic technologically advanced force to effectively fight in complex 
environments. Many organizations employing the meritocratic model are divisional in 
nature and can accomplish an array of elaborate activities. The meritocratic U.S. structure 
uses both a geographic division (CENTCOM, PACOM, NORTHCOM, etc.) and a 
functional division (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines) for orientation.  
The neo-traditional model, in contrast, has minimal formalization and is more 
functional in nature. This organizational design provides little flexibility and lacks 
autonomous activities. A large span of control is possible in the neo-traditional structure 
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due to the lack of specialization required for most tasks. Many of the developing nations 
of the world are officer-led organizations that employ the neo-traditional model. It was 
not uncommon in these countries to see a wide rift separating the officers and the enlisted 
soldiers. Additionally, one officer would typically directly supervise 20–30 men, which is 
quite high when compared to the typical U.S. officer performing the same job who only 
directly supervises 3–5 soldiers.  
H. PERSONNEL SECTION 
Table 2.   Personnel Contrasts between Neo-traditional and Meritocratic Structures 
Category Neo-traditional Structure Meritocratic Structure 
Specialization Low High 
Standardization Low High 
Training Low High 
Differentiation 
Amount of variation 
between different personnel 
positions 
Low High 
Person vs. position 
relationship 
Close Separate 
Authority base Neo-traditional Rule-based 
Personnel ratios of support 
personnel to war fighters 
Low High 
Complexity of work Low High 
Promotion Nepotistic/Political Meritocratic 
Operating core 
The personnel doing the 




Category Neo-traditional Structure Meritocratic Structure 
Skill levels Low High 
Variability of work 
activities 
Low High 
I. PERSONNEL ANALYSIS 
The most critical resource in the meritocratic model system is the personnel. The 
human resource component drives the effectiveness of the system. Properly trained and 
led individuals will propel an organization to success. The meritocratic model attempts to 
seek out and employ goal-oriented, self-motivated volunteers to accomplish their war-
fighting tasks. Additionally, employers of this model usually seek to better their forces 
through education and technological advancement. The meritocratic model employs 
highly technical, highly trained specialists who have an egalitarian mindset and work in a 
system of merit-based rewards for mission accomplishment.  
There are a few aspects of the U.S. Army that highlight the personnel aspects of 
the meritocratic model. To begin with, all soldiers are volunteers. The Army places an 
emphasis on personal development and education. At least some form of undergraduate-
level education is required to progress through the enlisted ranks and a master's degree is 
required to progress through the officer ranks. Additionally, enlisted members who 
demonstrate potential to be good officers are regularly placed in programs that allow 
them to earn a commission and transfer up to the officer ranks. 
The most basic difference between the meritocratic model and neo-traditional 
model is at the level of the basic soldier. In the neo-traditional model, the lowest echelons 
of warriors are typically conscripts who are given only the most rudimentary training 
required to perform duties. They fill these jobs due to poor education and lack of 
opportunities. They are motivated by a meager paycheck and power that comes with their 
reputation as a soldier. The low cost of these conscripts, as well as the speed with which 
they can be replicated, makes it very easy for leadership to view them as expendable. The 
Colombian military uses the conscription process and all adult males are required to serve 
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a minimum of two years. In Colombia in the mid 1990s, a former Colombian conscript 
commented about the expendable view of personnel on the part of the officer corp. 
According to the informant, it was not uncommon to depart on a routine jungle patrol 
with 35 men and return with 32. These were not combat related casualties. Soldiers 
would simply get lost in the jungle on training missions. The officers leading the patrol 
showed no concern for finding the missing men. Conscripts were viewed as low skilled 
and easily replaceable (Keller, 1998).  
Higher up the organizational food chain than the basic soldier, the neo-traditional 
model is led by appointees designated through political or familial relations. As a result 
of this appointment, the military leaders often seek to further the goals and objectives of 
their benefactors.  
The neo-traditional model also places little emphasis on the development of 
soldiers, who are generally poorly trained, low skilled, and have not been given any 
instruction that provides them with adaptive approach to military operations. The 
militaries usually work on a patronage system that rewards unquestioning loyalty and 
adherence to direct control. The Soviet military, during the cold war, was a good example 
of this; the KGB and the Communist Party put political factors ahead of military 
competence when selecting their officers (Herbert, 1975, p. 324). This lack of 
development may be an aspect of the greater cultural environment. Stanislav Andreski 
argues in Military Organization and Society that many social strata are fixed and prevent 
the movement of individuals upward in the power continuum (1968, p. 21). If there is no 
possibility of advancement, what would be the purpose of development? These types of 
societies are very unlikely to adopt the meritocratic model.  
J. EMPLOYMENT SECTION 
Table 3.   Employment Contrasts between Neo-traditional and Meritocratic Structures 
Category Neo-traditional Structure Meritocratic Structure 
Organizational goals Local Global 
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Capabilities Low High 
Reliance on technology Low High 
Coordinating Mechanisms Direct supervision Formal rules, standard 
operating procedures 
Formalization in written 
rules 
Low High 
K. EMPLOYMENT ANALYSIS 
Both models display vast divergence in their employment. The meritocratic model 
militaries tend to operate globally while the neo-traditional model countries operate 
locally. Because of the global scope, the meritocratic model needs to be able to perform 
in varied environments. Therefore, it relies on extremely capable individuals with 
advanced skills and leverages the employment of modern technology. These forces 
coordinate through a large number of standard operating procedures, which are refined 
through frequent interactive exercises to help reduce the uncertainty of the ever-changing 
battlefield. 
The neo-traditional model is typified with a limited or even internal scope. These 
forces rely heavily upon their leaders for guidance and direction. Few rules and 
regulations exist to guide them in the situations they encounter. Generally, they are 
forced to rely on institutional knowledge passed down from their predecessors by word of 
mouth. Limited technology availability may be a contributor to the continuation of this 
limited structure. Lack of educational opportunities perpetuates the cycle of ignorance 
and lack of advancement. Emily Goldman focuses much of her research on the diffusion 
of military technology throughout different cultures. Military organizational structures 
can be seen as an example of technology. Goldman identifies the elites, institutions and 
culture as having an effect on military innovation. The assimilation of ideas and 
meritocratic practices is dependent on the power broker’s resistance to the modification 
of the status quo (2006, p. 69).  
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L. CULTURAL SECTION 
Table 4.   Cultural Contrasts between Neo-traditional and Meritocratic Structures 
Category Neo-traditional Structure Meritocratic Structure 
Typical regime type Authoritarian Democratic 
Risk of government 
overthrow 
High Low 
Acceptance of innovation Low High 
Education Low High 
Diffusion of technology Low High 
 
M. CULTURAL ANALYSIS 
Culturally, both models appear to fit (be in synchronization with) their respective 
range of environments. The domestic factors of the regime that control the military affect 
the way the military is trained, organized, and equipped. These factors greatly influence 
the capability and power of the military, which will affect the achievable goals. For 
example, modern democratic militaries have little risk of military revolt in their nations. 
As a result, they do not try to limit access to military education or technological 
advantages. As previously discussed, these militaries are usually organized using the 
meritocratic model. Additionally, this combination of factors gives the military many 
capabilities and a lot of power, which can be projected around the entire globe.  
In contrast, governments employing the neo-traditional model are often plagued 
by a real internal threat of overthrow. Because the military is often a key component of 
regime change, the government employs safeguards to ensure that the military stays 
loyal. Gordon Tullock explains that one of the safeguards dictator’s uses is the 
appointment of politically loyal leaders to key positions of authority (1987). They are 
placed in position based on loyalty, rather than competence, and then frequently rotated 
to prevent collusion (1987). Other safeguards are a lack of education for soldiers and lack 
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of technologically advanced equipment, which could give the military or certain portions 
of the military a decided advantage over anti-regime forces. This combination of factors 
leads to a much less capable military that is often more concerned with domestic issues 
than international affairs. Even if the concern were directed externally, the power of the 
military to influence external events would be questionable. Thus, the goal with which 
each military is able to be directed seems to be very closely tied to the cultural factors of 
the associated nation-state.  
One recent example of the cultural nuances shaping militaries differently took 
place in Operation Iraqi Freedom. In order to fill key government positions with people 
loyal to him, President Saddam Hussein increasingly depended heavily on members of 
his family and tribal lineage to run the country. He appointed many members of the Al-
Tikriti tribe to key positions in the government in general and the military in particular in 
order to solidify his control over the country. On the other hand, the United States, with a 
democratic government and negligible possibility of military coup had government and 
military leaders hold positions based on merit instead of personal loyalties. The U.S. 
military was able to project its power to the other side of the globe and topple the Saddam 
regime with amazing speed. 
N. ECONOMIC SECTION 
Table 5.   Economic Contrasts between Traditional and Modern Structures 
Category Neo-traditional Structure Meritocratic Structure 
Resources Few or narrow base Many or broad base 
Typical national economic 
distribution 
 
Large lower class; bulk of 
population earns only low 
income 
 
Large middle class; bulk of 
population earns comfortable 
income 
Industrialization Low High 
Raw material resources Low or narrow High or broad 
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Human resources Disposable Valued 
Financial resources Low High 
 
O. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
Economic analyses show the meritocratic military model is able to draw from a 
much broader middle class. With this comes the benefit of having citizens who are more 
likely to have been exposed to technology and education. These modern nations usually 
have more resources, or at least a broader resource base from which to draw. 
Additionally, human resources usually carry extreme value. Nations that employ the neo-
traditional model are relatively poor or have a very narrow resource base, such as oil or 
diamonds. Perhaps as a result, the population is often viewed as a more expendable 
resource. Generally, there is less value placed on human life and this resource is 
relatively replaceable. When other resources are lacking, neo-traditional models are more 
prone to use mass-type warfare where soldier attrition is higher. 
P. ENVIRONMENTAL SECTION 
Table 6.   Environmental Contrasts between Neo-traditional and Meritocratic Structures 
Category Neo-traditional Structure Meritocratic Structure 
Complexity Low High 
Task environment Simple Complex 
Number & dissimilarity of 
operating environment 
Low High 
Stability High Low 
Economic conditions Poor Healthy 









Q. ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS 
The environment is the key component in the employment of the two models. The 
meritocratic and neo-traditional models fit in their environments. The meritocratic model 
is designed with the external environment in mind. The need to work on a global scale 
and adapt to complexity is a driving factor in the meritocratic model. The vibrant, 
educated middle class, good economic situations, and abundant resources are indicative 
of an environmental fit with the meritocratic structure. The antithesis of this is a good fit 
for the neo-traditional model, which is adapted to face an internal struggle and supports 
that aim well. Societies short on an educated middle class, resources, and a strong 
economic situation seem to be a good fit with the neo-traditional military model. Both 
systems maximize their resource potential and seek to support the regimes they represent.  
R. CO-RELATIONS 
One thing that should be apparent by now is the complex co-relation between 
many factors pertaining to the military organization and the social and cultural 
characteristics of the nation-state of which the military is a part. For example, the degree 
of democracy in a country tends to be positively correlated to the capability of their 
military. Likewise, the degree of industrialization of a country is related to its vertical 
complexity. In this context, we can assume that as a country develops more complicated 
and egalitarian systems of governance the military is more likely to be organized along 
the lines of the meritocratic model. Because this is probably related to available resources 
in the form of money, people, industry, etc., resources could probably be swapped out for 
any of the terms previously discussed in the relationships that demonstrate a strong 
correlation. It is also worth noting that the causal direction may be difficult to determine. 
Does the governance structure become more complicated and egalitarian as a result of 
military capabilities or vice versa? In all likelihood, they are probably endogenously 
related. However, there may be another causal mechanism, such as resource availability 
and diversity, which influences both governance structures and military capability. These 
relationships may be worth more in-depth research in the future. 
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Figure 4.   Co-Relational Relationship Hypothesis 
S. SUMMARY 
The meritocratic model is effective in the technology-driven, democratic, 
egalitarian, resource-rich world in which Americans live. However, a vast majority of the 
world is not living in conditions resembling those of the United States of America. 
Additionally, the goals of many foreign militaries are drastically different from those of 
the U.S. military, which conducts a range of operations from humanitarian aid to nuclear 
deterrence without omitting anything in between. As such, different organizational 
structures may be better adapted to the environment and goals of foreign militaries. The 
neo-traditional model may indeed be a perfect fit for the environment it is employed. A 
former Soviet strategist, Major General Aleksandr Svechin, summed up the idea of an 
organizational fit for the military quite well: "In all work related to the war plan, most 
important is harmony among all measures: even the best ideas, if they are not in harmony 
with the situation, will only do harm. And the same harmony is required of organizational 
measures"  (Svechin, 1927/1992, p. 188). 
 If leaders of the U.S. military can learn to understand indicators of an 
organizational fit in the environment of employment, it would improve FID: less time 
could be spent attempting to reorganize a military around a model that is unacceptable to 
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its leaders and members. The United States could accept that the meritocratic model may 
not be a good fit for foreign militaries. Instead of reorganizing to a structure, the host 
nation will not accept as soon as United States presence is terminated, the U.S. FID 
forces could accept and develop the existing organizational model. The time and 
resources could be used instead to improve FID by other means. 
With an organizational model of foreign militaries that remains the same, the 
United States could focus on improving the capabilities of the existing model. For 
example, the United States could implement courses to improve management techniques 
of the upper echelons, motivational techniques of field commanders, and increased core 
competency training of the average soldier. Any of these actions would be more 
productive than reorganizing foreign militaries to reflect the same model as the U.S. 
military only to have them change it back as soon as the United States leaves. Although 
these changes may not provide the foreign country with the same level of capability that 
the U.S. military enjoys, they will at least increase capabilities on the margin. Instead of 
forcing the meritocratic model from the top down, perhaps eventually other factors will 
change that will create a bottom up desire for the foreign military to reorganize to the 
meritocratic model.  
Initially, the goal of U.S. military FID should be to work within the confines of 
the organizational model present at the time of arrival. An analysis of the environment in 
which the foreign military exists as well as the goals of the government should determine 
if this model is indeed a good fit. If it is, then a plan of using the existing model is 
deemed appropriate. Modifying the model as the environment and goals change is the key 
goal. A long-term approach to FID will allow the United States to continue to get a 
dynamic assessment of the fit and modify the organizational model as appropriate. The 
idea is to keep all factors in a harmonious balance. U.S. military leaders would be wise to 
capture this lesson prior to employment of a FID force.  
The next chapter will show how the past two chapters are relevant to the case of 
Vietnam. Vietnam was the crucible of FID employment and demonstrates the argument 
as laid out, and analyzes the actions of our FID engagement.  
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III. FOREIGN ARMY BUILDING FAILURE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Vietnam War remains, to this day, a crucial conflict in the history of the 
modern U.S. military and it continues to shape strategic and tactical thinking. In fact, the 
term “nation-building” became synonymous with the United States effort to support the 
government of South Vietnam (Republic of Vietnam) and more specifically its veritable 
creation and partnership with the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). The United 
States failure to facilitate the building of an effective ARVN in the wider context of 
consolidating a stable South Vietnam, indirectly between 1954 and 1964 and more 
directly between 1964 and 1975, served to give nation-building a bad name.  
While the Vietnam War ended over 30 years ago, the specter of that protracted 
conflict in Southeast Asia in the 1960s and early 1970s is evident in U.S. military policies 
and doctrines that affect its performance today. Since 9/11, the American military has 
been fighting various conflicts that fall under the umbrella of the Global War on 
Terrorism (GWOT) in ways that reflect the fact that the shadow of the Vietnam War still 
hangs over day-to-day operations around the world. In the context of ongoing debate, 
major differences of opinion remain with regard to what lessons can, or should, be drawn 
from the Vietnam War. Many scholars and military historians search for any and all 
parallels to the Vietnam War and our current conflicts. Vast debate surrounds the mission 
in Afghanistan and its similarities and differences to Vietnam. The debate over Vietnam 
ranges across the years and arrives at various, and often divergent conclusions as 
reflected in books such as Stanley Karnow’sin Vietnam: A History, Neil Sheehan’s, A 
Bright Shining Lie, Andrew F. Krepinevich’s, The Army and Vietnam, John Nagl’s, 
Eating Soup with a Knife and Lewis Sorley’s, A Better War. In the context of this 
ongoing debate, it needs to be emphasized that this chapter, is not concerned with the 
Vietnam War as a whole (and whether it could have been won or not), although it does 
attempt to extract lessons from the United States’ experience in Southeast Asia. More 
specifically, it looks at the history of United States’ foreign army building in South 
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Vietnam in an effort to clarify what lessons, if any, were learned and what lessons were 
lost in relation to what would later become known as FID.  
B. FRENCH INDOCHINA, MILITARY TRADITION AND THE ORIGINS 
OF ARVN 1850–1954 
During the mid to late nineteenth century, the French colonized and subjugated 
the people of what became known as French Indochina (comprised of contemporary 
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia). One of the main goals of the French conquest was to 
exploit the rubber and rice in a fashion that complemented the economic needs of France. 
However, the French never fully consolidated their hold on the region. There were 
peasant revolts from the outset, and the rise of a potent mix of communism and 
nationalism by the 1930s encouraged the French colonizers to engage in repression using 
primarily French forces. Despite numerous revolts and the development of a major 
nationalist-communist movement during the period of Japanese occupation (1940–1945), 
it was not until 1948 that the French began in earnest to build a colonial military force 
comprised of Vietnamese soldiers (Tucker, 1998, p. 135). This force was initially called 
the Vietnamese National Army (VNA) and was established to complement the wider 
French war against the Viet Minh from 1946 to 1954. While nationalist in name only, the 
French used these disjointed forces to support their colonial aims. The VNA provided the 
initial foundations for what would later become the ARVN.  
In hindsight, the French set the VNA up for failure from the outset by building an 
Army in their own image. This reinforces the overall argument of the thesis and the 
points it brings out. The French, with growing financial support from the U.S, built up a 
sizable force throughout the 1950s. The focus of their efforts, however, was erroneously 
placed on the Big Three: Armor, Artillery and Infantry. The Big Three are intended to 
fight state on state actors with regimented uniformed combatants, and fight according to 
agreed upon norms in combat. By 1954, the VNA was comprised of 167,700 regular 
soldiers organized into 101 battalions (Krepinevich, 1986, p. 21). However, the French 
never allowed the Vietnamese to occupy command or leadership positions. All Officers 
and Non Commissioned Officers were French. Not surprisingly, when the French left in 
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1954, there was a complete lack of leadership experience in the ranks of the VNA. 
Additionally, the French had created a serious dependency on the material support they 
provided and it would detrimental consequences on the ARVN in the future. With the rise 
of the Ngo Dinh Diem regime (1955–1963) there was an attempt to formalize and 
professionalize the Vietnamese military. The emphasis was placed on legitimizing the 
military and training them to a higher standard. This appeared to “brief” well, but lacked 
any real practical application and saw little realization in the way of effective changes. 
The Army was re-titled the ARVN and that was really the only change that occurred.  
 C. THE FRENCH COLONIAL LEGACY, MILITARY TRADITION AND 
ARVN UNDER UNITED STATES TUTELAGE 1954–1964 
With the crushing defeat of the French by the Viet Minh at Dien Bien Phu in 
1954, and the former’s subsequent decision to withdrawal the United States took the 
fateful decision to step in and take on a more active role. No longer would financial 
support to the French be enough. Military advisors to the ARVN soon began to arrive in 
South Vietnam from the United States of America. In the global game of Capitalism vs. 
Communism, Vietnam would be the next location of a hot war between these two 
competing ideologies. The goal was conquest or abatement of these two ideologies in the 
region. 
The problem from the outset was that the U.S advisors did not really understand 
the flawed Vietnamese Army the French had built. In fact, there was no desire on the part 
of the U.S. Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG) to understand the colonial 
legacy and military traditions embodied by the VNA/ARVN that they were now 
positioning themselves to advise and assist. We mirror images ourselves onto the 
Vietnamese forces and saw what we wanted to see, not what was really there. Few 
attempted to learn about the Vietnamese Army and culture, and those that did were 
astonished at what they found.  
Initially, U.S. advisors found a regionally oriented and disjointed force structure. 
The primary advisor of the United States in the early years was COL Edward Geary 
Lansdale, of Philippine fame. Lansdale was “struck by the medieval warlord image,” 
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emphasizing how every ‘warlord’ faction “had its own armed forces complete with 
generals and battalions, its own political parties, and definite territories which it 
dominated” (Lansdale, 1971, p. 146). Solidifying this disjointed rabble would be a 
necessity if Prime Minister Diem were to have any control over the Armed forces. 
However, there were many obstacles in the way of the creation of a National Army. 
Adding to the problems, was the fact that the French stuck around in Vietnam and 
had competing agendas and goals from those of the U.S. military and its advisors. The 
French also remained very possessive over the Vietnamese, and became angry when the 
Americans would interfere with “their Vietnamese” (Lansdale, 1972, p. 150). 
Additionally, during this time period, independence was granted to Vietnam by the 
French, and Ngo Dinh Diem became the Prime Minister of the newly created Vietnam. 
This independence created a societal realignment and power grab by the newly 
independent peoples of Vietnam. Without the imposed societal structure of the French, 
many sought to make better lives for themselves and their families. Corruption, bribery, 
and influence became the new norm.  
Understandably, developing a viable security apparatus is a foundation from 
which to build upon and move forward. The French had handed off an indigenous 
military force, more or less completely devoid of leadership (a position the French had 
preserved for themselves), with no Officers and no Non-Commissioned Officers—and 
they had just changed the official military language from French to Vietnamese (Nagl, 
2002, p. 119). However, even after independence, the French High command maintained 
control over the military, its pay, promotions, and deployment unit as late as 1955 
(Lansdale, 1972, p. 172). Prime Minister Diem was in a tough spot when it came to a 
competent capable military. He needed it to provide security and stability; however, this 
also increased the likelihood of a coup by his military leaders. This became a balancing 
act for Diem. 
The initial goal of the MAAG was to provide advisors to high-level staff and 
leadership personnel in key positions. Cooperation finally occurred and the United States 
and French established a combined multi-national training group entitled the Training 
Relations Instruction Mission (TRIM). They were to advise and assist with the new 
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military establishment (Lansdale, 1972, p. 181). The focus became building a much-
needed national level Army. Problems were abundant in the development of these forces, 
and soon the United States began to send many troops to Vietnam to help stabilize the 
situation 
However, mission creep began to occur, advisors were pushed to lower echelons, 
and then into direct combat roles by 1964 (Tucker, 1998, p. 267). As the U.S presence 
increased, the relatively small MAAG would morph into the larger, more powerful 
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). 
During this time period, the U.S. advisors began the developmental approach that 
they continue to do to this day. The goals were very similar in nature to the French. The 
United States sought to build a large conventional military organized to fight set piece 
battles. If the goals and objectives were studied and understood in advance, it may have 
precluded a large-scale U.S. deployment to South East Asia. A strong cadre of competent 
U.S. advisors, with the resources of the United States government, may have limited the 
loss of U.S. Soldiers.  
 D. THE DECLINE OF ARVN, U.S. MILITARY ESCALATION AND THE 
END OF SOUTH VIETNAM 1965–1975 
A lack of understanding on the part of the U.S. military, led to a flawed FID 
approach in relation to ARVN, and eventually made the latter marginalized in the fight. 
The Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) was predominantly mediocre, lacked 
leadership, and needed training and equipment. However, the U.S. military chose to place 
its main focus on unilateral fighting and, starting in late 1964 and 1965, began to deploy 
even more U.S. combat troops. The training and equipping of the ARVN was relegated to 
an afterthought. The ARVN atrophied as the United States placed its emphasis on other 
areas like combat operations.  
1. The United States Contributes to Failure 
Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr. (1986) captures the essence of the FID problem in The 
Army and Vietnam. His main point is that the Vietnam War was a small war that we 
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fought as a big war. The Army was so focused on fire and maneuver warfare, that it never 
realized it was fighting an insurgency and not a conventional conflict. As Krepinevich 
notes, “The Army Concept of war is, basically, the Army’s perception of how wars ought 
to be waged and,” this was in turn “reflected in the way the Army organizes and trains its 
troops for battle” in Vietnam and elsewhere (Krepinevich, 1986, p. 5). This logic was 
transferred to the ARVN, and ironically inhibited their effectiveness and relevance. The 
U.S. military developed the ARVN as a direct reflection of themselves. This approach 
was not well thought out and was ignorant of the actual ARVN requirements.  
The U.S. military never took the time to analyze the existing force structure and 
their history with the French. Stereotypically, the conventional U.S. Army motto is: In 
the absence of knowing what to do, do what you know. The U.S. forces began to build an 
Army in their image. Kalev Sepp (2005), in “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency,” 
accurately spelled out that creating indigenous forces in the image of the intervening 
military is a largely unsuccessful practice. Additionally, The United States’ clear lack of 
understanding of the conflict they sent the U.S. military to resolve led to a flawed 
approach in their support of the ARVN.  
2. U.S. Army 
Additionally, John Nagl (2002) talks about the U.S. organizational culture and the 
reasons for the lack of focus on developing and employing host nation forces. The 
mentality of the conventional Army in Vietnam was completely focused on measurable 
offensive operations and the metrics they produced. The goal was to bring the enemy to 
the fight and get the enemy body count as high as possible. Body count equaled success 
to the U.S. military leaders in Vietnam. The U.S. military never understood that this was 
a Vietnamese fight. Selfishly and ignorantly, U.S. commanders wanted the combat tours 
to help with their own promotion potential. Combat performance and body counts got 
officers promoted. The system provided little reward for developing and employing 
ARVN forces.  
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With no incentive in place by the U.S. Army to become trainers, no one wanted 
the jobs that involved the ARVN. Even the highly qualified trainers in the Special Forces 
community were redirected to conduct search and destroy operations. Theoretically, the 
ARVN forces could actually inhibit promotions by taking missions away from 
conventional Army commanders. Understandably, the ARVN was relegated to a distant 
priority.  
3. ARVN 
The organizational design of the ARVN also had its drawbacks and flaws. Inept 
leaders occupied many command positions due to who they knew rather than what they 
knew. The system they operated under appeared to punish those who took risks. The 
famous advisor John Paul Vann states, there was a strong sense of risk aversion and an 
unwillingness to take casualties in the ARVN. “A deplorable condition… exists” Vann 
wrote, “because commanders at all levels who do nothing can still retain their command, 
and even advance, while those who are aggressive may be relieved if they suffer a 
setback or sustain heavy losses”(Sheehan, 1988, p. 91). This system was flawed by 
design, and would perpetuate an ARVN that had no will to fight.  
4. United States Errors in Vietnam  
The meritocratic U.S. military lacked a detailed understanding of the societal 
makeup of the South Vietnamese people. A critical look at the societal composition 
would have shown that there was a clear lack of a middle class and education was not 
widely held. These are two main factors that dictate a military structure. Additionally, an 
evaluation of the French organization and education of the ARVN would have shown the 
complete and appalling lack of leadership. The ARVN was a neo-traditional military with 
a clear separation between Officers and Soldiers. These factors should have indicated to 
the U.S. advisors that a 4-party modern meritocratic military model was not the correct 




due to the strict bifurcation in the society based on class, status, education, and 
economics. Structurally the approach the French and U.S. advisors utilized was doomed 
to fail.  
5. Objectives 
The structural mismatch was not the only flaw in the United States’ plan to build 
an army in their image. The objective and purpose of these forces were never clearly 
articulated. The United States built a military force based on their world outlook. The 
United States built a force to fight a state on state war and equipped the ARVN to fight a 
set piece battle. We helped build a force to conduct conventional warfare against a 
uniformed opponent following the laws of war. This demonstrated a clear lack of 
understanding for the type of conflict the ARVN was facing. The focus was on preparing 
and equipping the ARVN for a conventional battle with the North Vietnamese. The 
United States never really understood they were in a counterinsurgency fight with an 
irregular force. Therefore, this lack of understanding would be transferred to the ARVN. 
The ARVN were set up for failure from the beginning.  
The ARVN was ineffectually structured, incorrectly equipped, and ill-trained to 
fight the asymmetric enemy they were to encounter. This is reinforced by John Nagl 
(2002) in Eating Soup with a Knife, when he quoted a study by the Program for the 
Pacification and Long-Term Development of South Vietnam (PROVN). The PROVN 
study stated that the American policy in its entirety was flawed. Furthermore, the 
PROVN study stated that the creation of an Army in our image, the way we equipped the 
ARVN, and the way they were employed was critically flawed (Nagl, 2002, p. 160). 
While preparing for the big future war from the North, they lost the current fight.  
E. SUMMARY  
The U.S. military started in Vietnam in the 1950s with a small footprint of 
soldiers and equipment, and then expanded to over 500,000 before the war ended. The 
U.S. failure to develop a competent host nation military and security forces, led to the 
need for the United States to increasingly do all the heavy lifting; there were over 50,000 
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American fatalities as a result of poor use of indigenous forces. Vietnam taught the 
United States some incredible lessons in foreign army building. Robert McNamara 
(1995) in his book In Retrospect explains that if certain people do not want to win 
themselves, there is nothing anyone can do to make them want to win. Recognizing what 
motivates a people, and then leveraging that into the building of an Army, is the way to 
create an effective force.  
The United States used the wrong model in Vietnam. We had some help from the 
French in model selection and should have changed course. The modern meritocratic 
model did not work. The neo-traditional model would have been a better fit. The 
previously mentioned factors of structure, personnel, culture, economics, and the overall 
context, all support the relevance of the neo-traditional model discussed in detail in 
Chapter II. The U.S. military could benefit from this historical account and apply more 
relevant FID models in the future.  The chapters that follow will clarify why and where 
some elements of the U.S. Armed Forces grasped these lessons, and why and where other 
elements have continued to do what they do, despite the experience of the Vietnam War.  
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IV. COLOMBIA: A FOREIGN ARMY BUILDING SUCCESS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Since its exit from Vietnam, the U.S. Army has been aware of the need for 
capable American forces that can train, advise, and assist our allies to make their 
militaries more effective. In the wake of Vietnam, the Special Operation Forces (which 
were created in the years prior to the dramatic escalation of U.S. forces in Southeast 
Asia) were singled out to become the force of the future in foreign army building. The 
U.S. Congress codified this responsibility with the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols 
Department of Defense Reorganization Act in 1986. From that day forward, FID became 
a legislatively directed activity of the Special Operation Forces. However, not everyone 
thought the Special Operation Forces (or Special Forces as they are often called) were the 
most effective use of Army resources. The Army, in part because of Vietnam, was still 
primarily concerned with preparing for conventional warfare in the context of the Cold 
War with the U.S.S.R. The main goal of the Army was to be prepared to fight a full-scale 
set-piece battle in Europe, or elsewhere, and win.  
Reeling from the loss in Vietnam, U.S. military leaders vowed never again to 
fight a limited war where it vital national interests were not at stake. Then Secretary of 
Defense Casper Weinberger put forth a doctrine he believed would keep the United 
States from entering another Vietnam scenario. The Military thinking of the time was 
governed by the following guidelines put forth in Secretary of Defense Caspar 
Weinberger’s speech to the National Press club in November 28, 1984, entitled “The 
Uses of Military Power.” 
(1) “First, the United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless 
the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of 
our allies.” 
(2) “Second, if we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given 
situation, we should do so wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of winning.” 
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(3) “Third, if we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have 
clearly defined political and military objectives.” 
(4) “Fourth, the relationship between our objectives and the forces we have 
committed—their size, composition, and disposition—must be continually reassessed and 
adjusted if necessary.” 
(5)” Fifth, before the U.S. commits combat forces abroad, there must be some 
reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected 
representatives in Congress.” 
(6)” Finally, the commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be a last resort.” 
(Weinberger. 1984).  
This doctrine would condition the minds of Military and Political leaders for years 
following his speech. These leaders would never allow another Vietnam. The 1991 Gulf 
War was the culmination of this strategy and seemed to prove its theory correct. The 
United States was overwhelmingly successful and further reinforced the efficacy of this 
doctrine. However, limited war was a reality and we needed focus on building this 
capacity and the forces to conduct this type of warfare. 
Reluctantly, the U.S. military admitted its need for the Special Forces and their 
capabilities. However, the Special Forces would need to prove their worth to the U.S. 
military. It can be argued that the Special Forces earned their stripes in Latin America in 
the 1980s and 1990s. Engaged throughout the continent, they trained, advised and 
assisted foreign armies to carry out counterinsurgency operations. The Special Forces 
would hone their skills while working in conjunction with conventional Army leaders in 
the region. This chapter will begin by discussing the United States of America’s first 
post-Vietnam conflict in Latin America—El Salvador. It will lay out the lessons learned 
by the Special Forces in reference to foreign army building. It will then show how these 
lessons learned enabled the Special Forces to help the El Salvadorian government and 
military defeat a powerful guerrilla insurgency. Then, it will look at the way that the 
knowledge of the El Salvadorian experience was transferred to Colombia in the 1990s, 
and how the Special Forces and the U.S. Army assisted the Colombian government in 
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defeating a particularly long-standing and territorially wide-spread insurgency led by the 
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas (FARC—Revolutionary Armed Forces 
of Colombia).  
B. EL SALVADOR 
To begin, it is clear that the El Salvador experience was a great FID success for 
the United States The limited scope and military commitment to the cause forced the 
Army to adapt and overcome the 55-man limitation placed on the mission. The Army 
leadership employed Special Forces assets to support army building and training. Robert 
Kaplan (2005) notes in Imperial Grunts that “fifty-five Special Forces trainers in El 
Salvador accomplished more than did 550,000 soldiers in Vietnam” (p. 45). Meanwhile, 
Max Boot (2005) also acknowledges that “Flooding a country with U.S. troops is often a 
mistake, because they are ignorant about local conditions,” and “they often wind up 
doing more harm than good; better for a small number of highly specialized soldiers to 
work behind the scenes in cooperation with indigenous security forces”(p. 6). The U.S 
forces had also learned the lesson that not every nation is organized along the four-tiered 
modern model of the U.S. military. The system in El Salvador was a two-tiered, neo-
traditional structure much like the rest of the Latin Americas. The Officers felt 
themselves to be very much members of a military and social elite and had difficulty 
when working with Non-Commissioned American officers who had been promoted on 
the basis of merit.  
The El Salvadorian Officers were commissioned together as a cohort called a 
tanda. These officers would advance through the military together as time progressed. 
Officers that participated in this training, stated “Whatever an officer’s personal 
failings—stupidity, cowardice in battle, or moral profligacy—his career is secure through 
the rank of colonel, after which he may depart, with his tanda, into honorable retirement” 




The 2 tiered-neo traditional structure was further reinforced by the lack of an 
NCO corps. The concept of an NCO corps was totally lacking and difficult to explain to 
the El Salvadorian forces. The structure of the military was stratified with elite somewhat 
competent officers and poor conscripts just doing their service reluctantly (Bacevich, 
1988, p. 27). The U.S. forces established NCO academies and pushed the NCO concept 
on the El Salvadorian forces. The regime in charge was reluctant to embrace this change 
at all, but the younger generation of military saw the merits and somewhat hesitantly 
conformed. The system continued to resist the American attempts to force a structural 
change. The lesson learned should have been clear.  
Salvadorian military culture neither accommodated nor welcomed NCOs. In 
retrospect, the American attempt to create an NCO corps appears naïve and 
presumptuous. The lesson is clear: In choosing targets for institutional change, American 
military policy must concentrate on issues that are not only relevant to a 
counterinsurgency—as NCOs indisputably are—but also reasonably attainable given the 
war’s specific context (Bacevich, 1988, p. 28). The American military tended to be an all 
or nothing force during these conflicts. There are shades of grey in foreign army building, 
and both short term and long term goals.  
NCOs are a very important part of the military structure, and provide vast benefits 
when accepted and employed correctly. The mode of implementation would need to be 
changed to an indirect strategy over the long haul that didn’t terrify the existing elite’s 
fear of change. The excellence portrayed by U.S. NCOs and their engagement with Latin 
American Officers over the long haul demonstrated the advantages of their existence. 
Other Latin American nations would adopt our concept of the NCO on their own terms, 
and not at the orders of their American counterparts. The merit of this system would be 
realized over time and persistent engagement with competent U.S. NCOs. The lessons 
learned in El Salvador, would enable Americans to conduct FID with greater success in 
countries like Peru and Colombia. In fact, Colombia is becoming, or has already become, 
the ultimate FID success story of the post-Cold War era.  
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C. COLOMBIA 
The government of Colombia has undergone vast reforms that culminated with a 
new constitution in 1991. This constitution made a strong move toward democratization 
and created an overall improvement in the governmental system. In order for the nation 
to move forward security and stability must be present. Colombia turned to the United 
States for help with these issues. The U.S. government responded to requests from the 
Colombian government with “Plan Colombia” in 1999. This plan was primarily aimed at 
eradication of narcotics trafficking in and from Colombia, in order to lay the foundations 
for a stable and secure state. This initially narcotics based program was expanded after 
the horrific events on September 11, 2001 to include counter-terrorism. The U.S. 
provided millions of dollars and committed advisors to help the legitimate Colombian 
government solve its problems. Since 2002, President Uribe has increased his capacity to 
fight the FARC and build a safer, stronger Government.  
The cornerstone of any nation-building must be the establishment of security and 
stability. With the funds in place, and a commitment made by the U.S. military, they 
would set out to develop the Colombian Armed Forces. U.S. Southern Command would 
direct the military based programs in Colombia. The 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) 
would do the majority of the heavy lifting.  
With the advent of Plan Colombia in the late 1990s, the Special Forces began to 
build Counter Narcotics units in the troubled regions of Colombia. “In April 1999, the 7th 
SFG (A) deployed to Tolomaica, Colombia, to start training the 1st Colombian Counter-
Narcotics Battalion (BACNA). It was a 950-man battalion with a number of separate 
platoons to support CN Operations. This took nine months to complete, and the first 
BACNA became operational in December 1999 at Tres Esquinas” (Waddell, 2003, p. 
14).  
With the success of the new counter-narcotics units in the Colombian military the 




objectives. Adam Isacson and Eric Stoner from the Center for International Policy point 
out the new goals in their article: Highlights of the Bush Administration’s 2005 Latin 
America aid request. 
1. We will provide operational support (training, supplies, repair parts maintenance 
and infrastructure) and specialized equipment, including weapons, night vision 
goggles and communications, to the Army. The focus. of this support will be on 
the elite mobile brigades, the Rapid Reaction brigade (known by the Spanish 
acronym FUDRA) and the Commando and Lancero Battalions. 
 
2. The 5th and 18th Colombian Army Brigades, trained in 2003 to provide 
protection to the Cano Limon-Covenas pipeline, a key element of Colombia’s 
economic infrastructure, will receive additional munitions, equipment and 
training. 
 
3. Support will also include establishing a national training center and developing an 
automated logistical system. 
 
4. FMF funding will also support the Colombian Navy and Air Force and include 
the provision of interdiction boats, additional combat aircraft, training and 
infrastructure improvements, maintenance and operational support for Colombia’s 
C-130 transportation fleet. 
 
5. Our request includes funds to purchase battlefield medical treatment, CSAR 
[combat search and rescue] and medevac-related equipment and training for Army 
and Air Force units. 
 
6. FMF also supports naval interdiction programs by providing secure 
communications equipment, spare parts, and assistance to establish an operations 
center. 
 
7. Riverine forces will benefit from spare parts and other logistic support. 
 
8. The AKI [Anti-Kidnapping Initiative] provides tactical and investigative training 
and equipment to the Colombian Government's military and police anti-
kidnapping units (Unified Action Groups for Personal Liberty -Spanish acronym 
“GAULA”.) It is also assisting in the establishment of an interagency anti-
kidnapping Joint Task Force, developing an interagency database to collect, 
analyze and disseminate information on kidnappings and assist in upgrading 




This increase in force size and capability would help to create the much-needed 
capacity the Colombian government needed to bring security and stability to the country. 
The government buildup would begin and the era of the FARC would diminish.  
1. Success Begets Success 
Capitalizing on the successes of Plan Colombia, the government is vastly 
improving its military and its capabilities. President Uribe is strengthening the once 
fledgling national Government of Colombia. Former Ambassador to Colombia, Anna W. 
Patterson, in her testimony to congress in 2007, actively supports the notion the Plan 
Colombia has put the government on the right footing. Ms. Patterson states that: “The 
Colombian strategy also gives high priority to job creation and economic opportunities, 
and focuses on building the capacity of the Colombian government so it can sustain 
programs begun with U.S. support” (Patterson, 2007). Bruce Porter (1994) in his book 
War and the Rise of the State, shows all the advantages that can come to the government 
in a time of crisis. The central theme of this book is that states make wars, and wars make 
states. In the case of Colombia, we can extrapolate this down to: strong governments 
create security and stability, and security and stability create strong governments. It is a 
self-reinforcing cycle.  
The professionalization and training of the Colombian armed forces has provided 
Uribe with the aforementioned foundation of security and stability from which to build.. 
The rapid expansion of the Colombian armed forces since 2002 (see Figure 5), has helped 
to provide resources, reform, and modernization. Additionally, this rapid increase in 




Figure 5.   Military/Police numbers. 
2. NCO Growth 
The United States has had a good military relationship with the Colombian Army 
for decades. U.S. Army Special forces teams have been rotating to the country and 
conducting FID almost continuously. A gradual, long-term army building program was in 
place. The 4 Tiered modern modeled structure was taking root in some areas, albeit 
slowly. A warrant Officer program was attempted with Colombian aviators, and NCOs 
could be found in the Special Operations units. The established NCO academy in 
Tolemeida, was seen as appeasement to the United States for their aid and support for 
years. The goal was incremental change in building the capacity of the Colombian 
military. Post, 9/11 the focus on troubled spots around the world led to the United States 
reinforcing its commitment to its partners.  
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The rapid growth in the Colombian Armed forces has forced the use of NCO as 
small unit leaders. As Figure 5 has shown, the rapid expansion of the army has led to a 
shortfall of officer to lead units. The Officer Academies can simply not produce officers 
at a rate sufficient enough to keep up with the growth of the forces. NCOs are taking jobs 
once held by junior officers. The two-tiered Neo-traditional modeled structures are being 
eroded and the four-tiered modern modeled structures are appearing. Meritocracy seems 
to be taking hold incrementally due to necessity. Lack of resources in the officer corps 
has forced the hands of the Army leadership. The officers are forced to promote NCOs to 
positions of greater responsibility due to competence (Meritocracy). 
Since the advent of all of the reforms, and rise of the NCO corps in Colombia, the 
NCO academies are taking root. Recently, the Colombians opened a Command Sergeant 
Major (CSM) academy in Bogota. This is the senior enlisted person in the military’s rank 
structure. Kevin Sielig, a U.S. Army South Public Affairs officer, wrote an article entitled 
“Joint U .S. Colombian effort produces thriving CSM Academy.” In this article, he 
demonstrates the vibrant and competent rise of the NCOs in the Colombian Armed 
forces. The Academy’s commandant, Lt. Col. Arturo Herrera Castano, stated: “Change in 
our military due to the new rank of command sergeants major is evident.” Castano 
continues by saying: 
In the past, the sergeant major was viewed in their battalions and brigades 
as simply the senior enlisted, waiting for orders. This has now changed 
with an invigorated command for respect and responsibility for leading, 
preparing, and motivating enlisted troops. Instead of approaching 
commanders with problems, we are approached with solutions. (Sielig, 
2005, p. 4) 
3. Middle Class Growth 
As explained earlier in Chapter II, a lack of an NCO corps should be observed 
when no middle class is present, and vice versa. I believe that education and economic 
standing are indicators of a middle class. The data in Figure 6 shows a drastic decrease in 
Poverty, Unemployment and an increase in Economic growth and GDP per capita. With 
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the data presented, it also makes sense that in the future there will be a positive 
relationship between the rise of the middle class and the use of NCOs in the military.  
 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/93761.pdf 
Figure 6.   Growth of Middle Class 
D. SUMMARY 
The lessons learned in El Salvador and Colombia have served the Special Forces 
and the Army well. Success has come through patience and maturity. Rapid changes in 
societal norms cannot be expected overnight. A long-term protracted solution with vast 
dedication will bring about incremental change. It is important to continually evaluate the 
state of the society in which one works. A periodic reevaluation is necessary to maintain 
focus and modify the plan. It is a long-term solution to development with frequent near 
term adaptation.  
However, when a drastic change occurs in a society, it may act as a catalyst for 
change in the military structure. For example, armed conflict, lawlessness, or a rapid 
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influx of resources may act as enablers to transform a military structure.  As was seen in 
the case of Colombia, rapid growth in the military led to a drastic shortage of Officers to 
lead units. The shortcoming of Officers led to the acceptance and use of the NCO corps. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
This thesis shows that the United States FID policy and its conduct are flawed.  
History continues to repeat itself. Seemingly, the answers to our problems are known, but 
in spite of this knowledge, the United States continues to do other things.  Decades of 
small wars gave us the forces necessary to develop foreign armies. Post Vietnam 
solutions to our combat advisory roles became evident, and the Special Forces became 
the predominate FID force. The solutions to the problems of the Vietnam era are 
presented below.  We fixed the shortcoming s of foreign army building, and then, as you 
will see in the future of FID section below, we are back to the norm.  
The Vietnam experience forced the U.S. Army to further develop forces capable 
of conducting FID operations. The U.S. Special Forces greatly expanded after Vietnam, 
and was assigned the task of FID. Learning from the mistakes of Vietnam, the Army 
enabled these individuals to develop a system that rewarded performance in these areas. 
The U.S. Special Forces engaged nations throughout the world post Vietnam. Specifically 
in Latin America, success would come to the Special Forces trainers who learned rapidly 
the lesson from the past.  
These talented warriors became a strategic tool for the U.S. Government, and 
have conducted successful FID throughout the world in support of U.S. national 
objectives. Some of the specific lessons learned were. 
Lesson 1: Effective FID forces cannot be created overnight.  
Solution 1: The U.S. military built five permanent regionally oriented Special 
Forces groups in the decades that followed the Vietnam experience. These FID warriors 
were further enabled by congress mandating their roles and responsibilities. Special 
Forces were the experts in the arena of foreign army development.  
Lesson 2: A clearly defined role and mission for the indigenous forces is a must. 
It provides direction for the advisors and trainers. 
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Solution 2: Understanding the enemy you fight helps to focus the development of 
the correct force with the correct skill set. When the United States continually trains 
armies in our image it fails to analyze the current fight. The Vietnam experience is a 
classic example. The United States continually sought to build an army to fight a 
conventional war against an external enemy. The army was trained, advised, and 
equipped to perform these functions. 
Unfortunately, they were fighting an internal threat and not an external threat. The 
lack of correct force structure and development, led to a significant loss for the South 
Vietnamese and a huge black eye to the United States. The military learned slowly and 
began to analyze the enemy first and develop a capable force to combat them. Many 
times the enemy was an internal threat and required a vastly different approach than 
mirror imaging the military. The goal could be to conduct FID to prevent subversion, 
lawlessness, and terrorism to bring about internal security and stability.  
Lesson 3: U.S. advisors must work within the accepted social and cultural norms 
when building foreign armies. 
Solution 3: Understanding the culture begins long before the deployment. The 
U.S. military developed an extensive training program for the Special Forces. A grueling 
course that would inculcate the sensitivities of cultural differences aided in FID. 
Mandated language training and regional studies programs coupled with real world 
regional experience led to great FID success. Semiannual area studies were conducted 
and briefed to superior officers to ensure regional and cultural expertise. The Special 
Forces soldiers deployed throughout Latin America and worked hand in hand with their 
counterparts ensuring to not offend them or gloss over cultural differences.  
Lesson 4: The United States must develop an incentive program to reward 
officers for building competent host nation forces. 
Solution 4: Reluctantly, the Department of the Army allowed the Special Forces 
to become its own branch during the 1980s. The Special Forces branch was able to 
regulate and control assignments and promotions of their personnel. This enabled the 
Special Forces to reward those who were competent at FID. Military advising was 
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rewarded inside the community and spawned great success by promoting those who 
could successfully build foreign militaries.  
This thesis shows that the culture and goals of foreign militaries are deeply 
embedded, and therefore cannot be readily changed by U.S. personnel. The critical 
element that can be easily altered is the cultural understanding and the FID structural 
model the United States uses to increase military capabilities. A detailed pre-FID mission 
analysis of the existing structure, culture, and goals will enable FID executioners to 
develop an appropriate FID structural model approach. As evident with the Colombia 
case study, the Special Forces have made U.S. FID more effective in developing 
successful foreign militaries. The proper FID model was applied and was consistent with 
the existing structure, culture, and goals of the host nation military. The take away for 
this thesis is that: The culture and structure are resident to a foreign military are not 
controllable by U.S. personnel. The one element we can alter is the FID model we 
attempt to employ. Cultural understanding brings success in FID with a lot less effort 
and resources on the part of the United States Government.  
A. THE FUTURE OF FID 
As history has shown, the U.S. military continually forgets the lessons of the past. 
The United States is currently fighting a determined insurgency in the country of 
Afghanistan. Erie similarities to the Vietnam experiences have appeared. The Special 
Forces are mostly employed as direct action assets that attempt to kill and capture 
insurgents. The military is dragging the bottom of the barrel to find FID trainers. 
Frequently, Army National Guard soldiers with little real world experience train the 
Afghani National Army. It is also common to find Navy or Air Force personnel involved 
in FID training.  
Currently in Afghanistan, there is a huge shortage of trained Afghani National 
Army forces. The foundation for security and stability is missing. So we are trying to 
rush them into a meritocratic model force with none of the factors that will support this 
type of model—Structural, Personnel, Employment, Cultural, Economic, and the 
Environment. The NY Times recently published an article entitled “Reviews Raise Doubt 
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on Training of Afghan Forces,” which reinforces the ideas provided in this thesis. 
Journalists in Afghanistan, Thom Shanker and John Cushman (2009), note that there is a 
lack of competent and capable leadership present in the Afghan military. Additionally, 
approximately 25% of the Afghani forces quit each year. In a neo-traditional society, 
leadership will be harder to come by. Some traits are just not rewarded by certain 
societies that are not based on meritocracy. 
Lessons just don’t seem to be getting learned. “In both countries, the 
United States sought to create an indigenous army modeled in its own 
image, based on U.S. army organization charts. With the ARVN in South 
Vietnam and the ANA in today's Afghanistan, assignment of personnel as 
combat advisors and mentors was the absolute lowest priority. (Johnson, 
2009) 
The Military seems to be building a force in its image, as it has done so many 
times in the past. The National Army is being trained an equipped as though they were 
preparing to fight an external threat. They continue to misjudge and misunderstand the 
enemy. This has striking similarities to the Vietnam experience. The creation of a 
National Government and a National Military force are none other than mirror imaging 
on the part of the United States. A more regional orientation may be in order. 
The United States consistently and profoundly misunderstood the nature 
of the enemy it was fighting in each circumstance. In Vietnam, the United 
States insisted on fighting a war against communism, while the enemy was 
fighting a war of national reunification. In Afghanistan, the United States 
of America still insists on fighting a secular counterinsurgency, while the 
enemy is fighting a jihad. The intersection of how insurgencies end and 
how jihads end is nil. It's hard to defeat an enemy you don't understand, 
and in Afghanistan, as in Vietnam, this fight is being played out in a 
different war. (Johnson, 2009) 
The United States needs to stop focusing on the similarities and remember the 
lessons of history. The U.S. military has a force capable and competent of conducting 
these FID missions. The U.S military is just using the wrong tool to do the job. Special 




can train, advise, and lead these men into combat. They will be responsible for a unit’s 
development from start to finish. FID success in a given nation is, after all, the ultimate 
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